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Salarios de eficiencia en un modelo de crecimiento económico


  • Mauricio Rodriguez



En este artículo se introducen los salarios de eficiencia como microfundamento para explicar la existencia de desempleo involuntario permanente y la rigidez de los salarios a la baja. Los salarios de efciencia se incorporanen un modelo de crecimiento económico de generaciones traslapadas, en el cual se puede alcanzar un equilibrio de largo plazo en el que existe desempleo involuntario permanente, explicado por la rigidez de los salarios.

Suggested Citation

  • Mauricio Rodriguez, 2009. "Salarios de eficiencia en un modelo de crecimiento económico," DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 005359, UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO.
  • Handle: RePEc:col:000092:005359

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    1. Mario Chacon & James A. Robinson & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"," NBER Working Papers 12789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    4. Kristine Eck & Lisa Hultman, 2007. "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 44(2), pages 233-246, March.
    5. Jorge Restrepo & Michael Spagat & Juan Vargas, 2004. "The Dynamics of the Columbian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset," Homo Oeconomicus, Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 396-429.
    6. Jean-Paul Azam & Anke Hoeffler, 2002. "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 39(4), pages 461-485, July.
    7. Wintrobe,Ronald, 1998. "The Political Economy of Dictatorship," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521583299, March.
    8. James D. Fearon, 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 275-301, May.
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