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Optimal Leniency Programs in Antitrust


  • A. Pinna


This paper analyses the incentive structure underlying the adoption of leniency programs in antitrust enforcement. The enforcement of competition law is treated as the delegation of the economic activity from the government to private firms. The model contributes to the debate over desirability of granting leniency to more than one cartelists. For this purpose, I introduce a probability of conviction that depends on authority-specific characteristics. This results in the optimal number of leniencies being specific to national authorities and market structures. The model confirms a result widely acknowledged in the antitrust literature - a program that merely reduces sanctions to the first reporter is ineffective.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Pinna, 2010. "Optimal Leniency Programs in Antitrust," Working Paper CRENoS 201018, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
  • Handle: RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201018

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Javier Capó Parrilla & Antoni Riera Font & Jaume Rosselló Nadal, 2005. "Dutch Disease in Tourism Economies. Evidence from Spain," CRE Working Papers (Documents de treball del CRE) 2005/01, Centre de Recerca Econòmica (UIB ·"Sa Nostra"), revised Jan 2005.
    2. Lutkepohl, Helmut, 1982. "Non-causality due to omitted variables," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 367-378, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2011. "Corporate Leniency with Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre-emption," Economics Working Paper Archive 573, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.

    More about this item


    leniency; deterrence; antitrust;

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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