Iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies in binary voting agendas with sequential voting
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Keywordsperfect information games; extensive games; backward induction; weakly dominated strategies; iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies; binary voting agendas; sequential voting;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2005-09-02 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CDM-2005-09-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DCM-2005-09-02 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-DCM-2005-09-11 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-02 (Game Theory)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-09-02 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2005-09-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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