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Réformer la sécurité de la vieillesse - Effets et alternatives


  • Nicholas-James Clavet
  • Jean-Yves Duclos
  • Bernard Fortin
  • Steeve Marchand


Le gouvernement fédéral a annoncé dans son dernier budget son intention de reporter l'âge d'admissibilité aux prestations de la Sécurité de la Vieillesse et de Supplément de Revenu Garanti de 65 à 67 ans. À terme (c'est-à-dire, en 2030), ce report devrait augmenter les revenus nets du gouvernement fédéral de 6,9 milliards de dollars (en dollars constants de 2012), mais diminuer de 620 millions de dollars ceux des provinces. À comportement de travail et d'épargne constant, ce report devrait aussi hausser de 6 % à 17 % le taux de faible revenu des individus de 65 et 66 ans. Des réformes alternatives de la Sécurité de la Vieillesse pourraient permettre d'obtenir des effets semblables en termes de finances publiques sans entraîner pour autant de tels impacts sur les taux de faible revenu des aînés.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicholas-James Clavet & Jean-Yves Duclos & Bernard Fortin & Steeve Marchand, 2013. "Réformer la sécurité de la vieillesse - Effets et alternatives," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-05, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2013s-05

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    ; Sécurité de la vieillesse; finances publiques; pauvreté;

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