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L'Allocation universelle est-elle réellement en mesure de modifier l'équilibre du marché du travail?

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  • Samir Amine
  • Pedro Lages Dos Santos

Abstract

Many economists (Atkinson, 1995, Ferry 1995) have presented the mechanism of l'Allocation universelle as the new way forward by the modern social protection. In this article, we propose first to recall the context in which takes up the debate on l'Allocation universelle. Using a matching model in which horizontal differentiation of firms and workers is represented by a circle à la Salop (1979), we show that the introduction of l'Allocation universelle don't affect the equilibrium labor market. Face à la progression de la pauvreté et à la relative inefficacité de leurs systèmes redistributifs, de nombreux pays se tournent aujourd'hui vers de nouveaux instruments de politique sociale. De nombreux économistes, parmi lesquels Atkinson (1995), Ferry (1995) ou bien encore Van Parijs (1990) ont trouvé là l'occasion de présenter le mécanisme de l'Allocation universelle comme la nouvelle voie à emprunter par la protection sociale moderne. Nous nous proposons donc d'abord de rappeler dans quel cadre prend place la réflexion sur l'Allocation universelle pour montrer ensuite, dans un modèle d'appariement avec différenciation des agents que, contrairement à ce que peuvent laisser entendre les conclusions de certains travaux sur le sujet, l'introduction d'une véritable Allocation universelle n'a en fait aucun effet sur l'équilibre du marché du travail.

Suggested Citation

  • Samir Amine & Pedro Lages Dos Santos, 2011. "L'Allocation universelle est-elle réellement en mesure de modifier l'équilibre du marché du travail?," CIRANO Working Papers 2011s-02, CIRANO.
  • Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2011s-02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; negative income tax; technological choices.; Allocation universelle; appariement; productivité.;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • J48 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Particular Labor Markets; Public Policy
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

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