A selected survey of traditional and evolutionary game theory
This note reviews the game theoretic literature with the aim of highlighting the similarities and dissimilarities between what we term traditional game theory and evolutionary game theory. The focus is on the contributions of evolutionary game theory to the body of knowledge at the disposal of the game theorist. The note is intended for people with interests in economics and who are familiar with traditional game theory but not necessarily familiar with evolutionary game theory. The main objective is to reach out to the numerous economists and indeed, other social scientists, who are not as yet initiated in the basic theory of of evolutionary games. A major conclusion of this note is that, applications of evolutionary game theory in the analysis of economic problems, especially, in the areas of natural, environmental and development economics are long overdue.
|Date of creation:||2002|
|Date of revision:|
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