Modeling a Housing and Mortgage Crisis
The purpose of this paper is to explore financial instability in this case due to a housing crisis and defaults on mortgages. The model incorporates heterogeneous banks and households. Mortgages are secured by collateral, which is equal to the amount of housing which agents purchase. Individual default is spread through the economy via the interbank market. Several comparative statistics illustrate the directional effects of a variety of shocks in the economy.
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- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2001.
"Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1304R5, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2004.
- Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos & Martin Shubik, 2001. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1304, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- P. Dubey & J. Geanakoplos & M . Shubik, 2001. "Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium," Department of Economics Working Papers 01-07, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
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