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Les lois contre les restrictions de la concurrence dans l’ancienne common law. Un essai de décryptage de l’évolution de la doctrine légale

Author

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  • Vesselina Spassova

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

Abstract

L’objectif de cet article est d’identifier les sources de l’antitrust contemporain dans des anciennes doctrines juridiques, notamment celles de la common law. Les restrictions de la concurrence et du commerce étaient poursuivis et sanctionnées en Angleterre depuis le début du Moyen Age et bannies par de multiples décrets et lois. Une analyse plus attentive de cette doctrine juridique démontre, néanmoins, qu’elle était, premièrement, d’une double inspiration. D’une part, les décrets des Rois étaient guidés non pas par le désir de limiter les monopoles privés, mais par celui de protéger ceux crées par la couronne. Un second courant, qui apparait plus tard et se manifeste par des lois parlementaires vise, au contraire, de limiter les monopoles sous protection royale. La seconde raison du développement des lois de restriction de la concurrence était l’incompréhension, qui régnait à l’époque, du processus marchand et du rôle de l’entrepreneur et des intermédiaires des échanges. Une meilleure compréhension des mécanismes du marché va donner origine au cours du XVIIIème et du XIXème siècle à un assouplissement de la doctrine des restrictions de la concurrence. Ainsi, les juges et les tribunaux de cette époque demeuraient conscients des contradictions qui existaient entre la liberté contractuelle et les lois contre les restrictions de la concurrence et l’impertinence de ces dernières pour la régulation des interactions marchandes. La continuité de cette expérience séculaire a été interrompue par le Sherman Act, qui, bien qu’inspiré par les lois contre les restrictions de la concurrence, n’a pas intégré l’évolution de la doctrine juridique.

Suggested Citation

  • Vesselina Spassova, 2006. "Les lois contre les restrictions de la concurrence dans l’ancienne common law. Un essai de décryptage de l’évolution de la doctrine légale," CAE Working Papers 41, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
  • Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:41
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    File URL: http://junon.u-3mrs.fr/afa10w21/RePEc/cgm/wpaper/DR_41_0607_Spassova.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust; histoire; restrictions de la concurrence; monopole;

    JEL classification:

    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

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