IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Competing for Claims to Property


  • Stergios Skaperdas
  • Constantinos Syropoulos


Existing work on the costs of insecure property has largely focused on the overexploitation problem of common pool resources. We investigate other costs of insecure resources including uncertainty costs, lack of tradeability,and conflict - within a setting in which adversaries compete for claims to an insecure resource by making choices between production and appropriation. We also examine the different types of regimes or conventions about settling disputes that can arise in our setting: winner-take-all conflict; contracting to divide the contested resource; and contracting to divide the resource with the possibility of trade in other commodities. We find conditions under which insecure property can lead one or more agents to ex ante prefer not to trade and thus have an incentive to commit not to trade. For each regime we consider, we derive comparative static results and show how, regardless of the regime, claims to property systematically vary with the characteristics of the adversaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Stergios Skaperdas & Constantinos Syropoulos, 1995. "Competing for Claims to Property," CESifo Working Paper Series 85, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_85

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The tyranny of inequality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 521-558, June.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.