Anti-evasion auditing policy in thepresence of common income shocks
When fairly homogeneous taxpayers are affected by common incomeshocks, a tax agency's optimal auditing strategy consists of auditing alow-income declarer with a probability that (weakly) increases with theother taxpayers' declarations. Such policy generates a coordination gameamong taxpayers, who then face both strategic uncertainty - about theequilibrium that will be selected.and fundamental uncertainty - about thetype of agency they face. Thus the situation can be realistically modelledas a global game that yields a unique and usually interior equilibriumwhich is consistent with empirical evidence.Results are also applicable to other areas like regulation or welfarebenefit allocation.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2006|
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