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Elementos de la gestión de proyectos

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Listed:
  • Gabriel Romano
  • Enrique Yacuzzi

Abstract

Presentamos los conceptos centrales de la gestión de proyectos, una actividad orientada a aumentar la probabilidad de obtener resultados organizacionales favorables con la aplicación de conocimientos, habilidades, herramientas y técnicas selectas de la administración, dentro de un marco temporal específico. Describimos, como elemento motivador, el contraste entre un proyecto antiguo, la Muralla China, con un proyecto moderno, la represa de Tres Gargantas. Una adecuada gestión de proyectos es un componente fundamental para sostener el crecimiento de una firma. El documento de trabajo enumera algunas características de los proyectos y cita algunas de sus fuentes; también distingue entre empresas “proyectizadas” y “funcionales”, como dos tipos ideales, entre las cuales se ubican las empresas “matriciales”. El trabajo hace hincapié en el concepto de proceso y, en particular, coloca a la gestión de proyectos en el marco del ciclo de la mejora continua, al cual se le agregan los procesos de inicio y de cierre. En este marco se detallan nueve áreas del conocimiento aplicables en los proyectos: gestión de la integración, del alcance, del tiempo, del costo, de la calidad, de los recursos humanos, de las comunicaciones, de los riesgos y de las adquisiciones. Las nueve áreas del conocimiento deben tratarse con el nivel de profundidad que exige cada proyecto, pero, conceptualmente, deben considerarse siempre con un método estructurado como el descripto en este documento, para potenciar la probabilidad de éxito.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriel Romano & Enrique Yacuzzi, 2011. "Elementos de la gestión de proyectos," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 449, Universidad del CEMA.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:doctra:449
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Gestión de proyectos; organizaciones “proyectizadas”; gestión de la integración de un proyecto; gestión del alcance de un proyecto; gestión del tiempo de un proyecto; gestión del costo de un proyecto; gestión de la calidad de un proyecto; gestión de los recursos humanos de un proyecto; gestión de las comunicaciones de un proyecto; gestión de los riesgos de un proyecto y gestión de las adquisiciones de un proyecto.;

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • O22 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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