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Deconcentration, political and fiscal decentralization, in Morocco

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  • Maria EL KHDARI

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Abstract

The paper examines how the Government of Morocco has addressed the issue of decentralization in recent years and how these processes have evolved and affected fiscal and public policies. More specifically, this paper analyzes the current legislative and institutional provisions governing administrative, political and fiscal decentralization in Morocco and presents a detailed analysis of the decentralized tax system. It analyses the role of each tier and the political, administrative and fiscal prerogatives of their respective councils. It appears from this analysis that the Moroccan system is still largely centralized. First, through the continued control of the central government via the tutelle. Second, because of the low financial autonomy of the local governments which remain widely dependent on intergovernmental transfers. Finally, it appears that the shared management of local taxation by different tiers of government can result in a lack of communication and information sharing as well as a lack of commitment from those that manage the collection on behalf of others. The regional level should be given more power to oversee and harmonize the prerogatives of each level of subnational government.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria EL KHDARI, 2018. "Deconcentration, political and fiscal decentralization, in Morocco," Working Papers 201804, CERDI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1918
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    Keywords

    Deconcentration; Political decentralization; Fiscal decentralization; Local taxes; Local governments; Morocco.;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

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