IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cda/wpaper/380.html

Conditional Dominance in Games with Unawareness

Author

Listed:
  • Burkhard C. Schipper

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic games with unawareness consisting of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of dynamic games with unawareness. The generalized normal form associated with a dynamic game with unawareness consists of a partially ordered set of games in normal form. We characterize strong rationalizability (resp., prudent rationalizability) in dynamic games with unawareness by iterated conditional strict (resp., weak) dominance in the associated generalized normal form. We also show that the analogue to iterated admissibility for dynamic games with unawareness depends on the extensive form. This is because, under unawareness, a player's information set not only determines which nodes she considers possible but also which game tree(s) she is aware of.

Suggested Citation

  • Burkhard C. Schipper, 2026. "Conditional Dominance in Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 380, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:380
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.dss.ucdavis.edu/files/uyvgkrfx3ibfd6g0bqnb0i2jwfqt/condom20260428.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alejandro Francetich & Burkhard Schipper, 2025. "Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure under Unawareness," Working Papers 374, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    3. Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 11-30.
    4. Li, Sanxi & Peitz, Martin & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2016. "Information disclosure and consumer awareness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 209-230.
    5. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    7. Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, 2012. "Incorporating unawareness into contract theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 181-194.
    8. Kym Pram & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2025. "Efficient Mechanisms under Unawareness," Papers 2504.04382, arXiv.org.
    9. Simon Grant & John Quiggin, 2013. "Inductive reasoning about unawareness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(3), pages 717-755, November.
    10. Auster, Sarah & Pavoni, Nicola, 2024. "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    11. Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020. "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 329-367.
    12. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
    13. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.
    14. Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2019. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(1), pages 41-88, January.
    15. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
    16. Leandro Rêgo & Joseph Halpern, 2012. "Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 131-155, February.
    17. Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 219-249, June.
    18. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
    19. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard Schipper, 2025. "Disclosure under Unawareness: An Experiment," Working Papers 370, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    20. Heifetz Aviad & Meier Martin & Schipper Burkhard C., 2021. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 525-556, June.
    21. Jagau, Stephan & Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in psychological games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    22. Emiliano Catonini, 2024. "Iterated Admissibility does not Refine Extensive-form Rationalizability," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(663), pages 3017-3026.
    23. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Unawareness - A Gentle Introduction to both the Literature and the Special Issue," Working Papers 145, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    24. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March.
    25. Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2012. "Incentives for Unaware Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(3), pages 1151-1174.
    26. Auster, Sarah, 2013. "Asymmetric awareness and moral hazard," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 503-521.
    27. , & ,, 2013. "The order independence of iterated dominance in extensive games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    28. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    29. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Unawareness - A Gentle Introduction to both the Literature and the Special Issue," Working Papers 153, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    2. Alejandro Francetich & Burkhard Schipper, 2025. "Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure under Unawareness," Working Papers 374, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Heifetz Aviad & Meier Martin & Schipper Burkhard C., 2021. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 525-556, June.
    4. Ki Vin Foo & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2025. "Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness," Working Papers 369, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Gaia Belardinelli & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2023. "Implicit Knowledge in Unawareness Structures," Working Papers 360, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Perea, Andrés, 2022. "Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 11-30.
    7. Norimasa Kobayashi & Yasuo Sasaki, 2024. "Rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium in static games with unawareness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(3), pages 765-790, September.
    8. Burkhard C. Schipper & Hang Zhou, 2022. "Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form," Working Papers 352, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    9. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard Schipper, 2025. "Disclosure under Unawareness: An Experiment," Working Papers 370, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    10. Burkhard C. Schipper & Hang Zhou, 2026. "Level-k thinking in the extensive form," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 81(1), pages 149-189, February.
    11. Guarino, Pierfrancesco, 2020. "An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 257-288.
    12. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 176, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    13. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 204, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    14. Martin Meier & Andres Perea, 2024. "Forward Induction in a Backward Inductive Manner," Department of Economics Working Papers 99/24, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    15. Antoine Dubus, 2020. "Asymmetric awareness and heterogeneous agents," Rationality and Society, , vol. 32(4), pages 461-484, November.
    16. Ying-Ju Chen & Xiaojian Zhao, 2013. "Solution Concepts of Principal-Agent Models with Unawareness of Actions," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-24, August.
    17. Catonini, Emiliano, 2020. "On non-monotonic strategic reasoning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 209-224.
    18. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    19. Burkhard Schipper & Hee Yeul Woo, 2014. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Working Papers 148, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    20. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2014. "A doxastic behavioral characterization of generalized backward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 221-241.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:380. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Letters and Science IT Services Unit (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/educdus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.