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Beyond the Cartel Law Handbook: How Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures can Undermine Conventional Enforcement Tools

  • Andreas Stephan

    ()

    (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

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    The combination of leniency programmes, high sanctions, complaints from customers and private actions for damages, has proven very successful at uncovering and punishing cartel agreements in the US. Countless jurisdictions are being encouraged to adopt these ‘conventional’ enforcement tools, in the absence of an international competition authority. The purpose of this paper is to widen the debate on cartel enforcement by identifying three issues which can undermine their effectiveness in some jurisdictions: (1) Corruption and organised crime; (2) Social norms that are sympathetic to collusive practices; (3) Collectivist business cultures built on personal relationships.

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    File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP08-29.pdf
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    Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 08-29.

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    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: Sep 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-29
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