Educational as a Positional Good : The Role of Vouchers
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
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