Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983
We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.
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|Date of creation:||Mar 2000|
|Date of revision:||Oct 2001|
|Publication status:||Published: Revised version in Public Choice, Vol. 109, No. 1-2 (October 2001), pp. 69–99|
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