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Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983



We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive polical economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influcence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitely distinguished and computed.

Suggested Citation

  • Louis Hotte & Stanley L. Winer, 2000. "Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Application to the United States, 1973 and 1983," Carleton Economic Papers 00-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2001.
  • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:00-11

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, March.
    2. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, March.
    3. Lockwood, Ben, 1993. "Commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 141-162, September.
    4. Hamilton, Jonathan H & Slutsky, Steven, 2000. " Decentralizing Allocation and Distribution by Separation with Information Transfers," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 289-318.
    5. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, March.
    6. A. B. Atkinson & N. H. Stern, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 119-128.
    7. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695, March.
    8. Boylan, Richard T & McKelvey, Richard D, 1995. "Voting over Economic Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 860-871, September.
    9. Hettich, W. & Winer, S.L., 1993. "The Political Economy of Taxation," Papers 8, Carleton - Business Administration.
    10. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    11. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521556545, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hotte, Louis & Winer, Stanley L., 2012. "Environmental regulation and trade openness in the presence of private mitigation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 46-57.
    2. Tridimas, George & Winer, Stanley L., 2005. "The political economy of government size," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 643-666, September.
    3. George Tridimas & Stanley L. Winer, 2004. "A Contribution to the Political Economy of Government Size: 'Demand', 'Supply' and 'Political Influence'," Carleton Economic Papers 04-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    4. Andreas Haufler & Alexander Klemm & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Economic integration and the relationship between profit and wage taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(3), pages 423-446, March.

    More about this item


    political competition; probabilistic voting; political influence; tax policy; public goods; GEMTAP; computable equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C68 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computable General Equilibrium Models


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