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‘UK domestic energy contracts, the 28 day rule, and experience in Sweden’

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  • Littlechild, S.

Abstract

In the UK, domestic customers must be able to terminate energy contracts at 28 days’ notice. This has been seen as a transitional protection for customers and for competition. This paper reviews the arguments for and against the 28 day rule, and examines the extent to which UK suppliers have offered fixed-price fixed-term contracts. It also looks at experience in Sweden, where there is no such restriction and where there is greater use of fixed-price fixed-term contracts. The paper concludes that there is no longer a need for the 28 day rule to protect customers, and that it is more likely to restrict than to protect competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Littlechild, S., 2004. "‘UK domestic energy contracts, the 28 day rule, and experience in Sweden’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0431, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0431
    Note: CMI45, IO
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    File URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/electricity/publications/wp/ep45.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Littlechild, Stephen, 2006. "Competition and contracts in the Nordic residential electricity markets," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 135-147, September.
    2. Littlechild, Stephen, 2006. "Residential energy contracts and the 28 day rule," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 44-62, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition; electricity; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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