IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/brs/wpaper/350.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Microcrédito com moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Rodrigo Peñaloza

    () (Departamento de Economia (Department of Economics) Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação (FACE) (Faculty of Economics, Administration, Accounting and Information Science) Universidade de Brasília)

  • Raquel Filgueiras

    (Departamento de Economia (Department of Economics) Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação (FACE) (Faculty of Economics, Administration, Accounting and Information Science) Universidade de Brasília)

Abstract

O problema dos incentivos nos contratos de microcrédito foi estu- dado por Laffont & N'Guessan (2000) no contexto de seleção adversa. Construímos um modelo Principal-Agente para modelar o microcrédito no contexto de moral hazard. A novidade é que, em nosso modelo, as restrições de compatibilidade de incentivos incorporam a responsabilidade conjunta, que é a principal característica dos contratos de microcrédito. Determinamos os contratos ótimos tanto no caso de responsabilidade privada limitada como sem responsabilidade privada limitada, em cada caso calculando o excedente do Principal e estabelecendo as condições para contratos interiores e contratos de canto.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodrigo Peñaloza & Raquel Filgueiras, 2011. "Microcrédito com moral hazard," Working papers - Textos para Discussao do Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia 350, Departamento de Economia da Universidade de Brasilia.
  • Handle: RePEc:brs:wpaper:350
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://vsites.unb.br/face/eco/textos/didaticos/WP%20350.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2011
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    microcrédito; moral hazard; responsabilidade conjunta;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:brs:wpaper:350. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luciano Póvoa). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deunbbr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.