Evasão fiscal sob estruturas comportamentais
We study the strategic interactions between the scal authority and the taxpayer regarding tax evasion and auditing. We t this interaction into a Bayesian game and introduce the concept of behavioral consistency, which helps reducing the number of available strategies and models the stylized fact according to which the choice to evade is subject to behavioral patterns.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Universidade de Brasília UnB - Campus Universitário Darcy Ribeiro Asa Norte CEP 70910-900, Brasília, Brasil|
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