IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Genetic Algorithm for the Structural Estimation of Games with Multiple Equilibria

  • VICTOR AGUIRREGABIRIA

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Boston University)

  • PEDRO MIRA

    ()

    (Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI))

This paper proposes an algorithm to obtain maximum likelihood estimates of structural parameters in discrete games with multiple equilibria. The method combines a genetic algorithm (GA) with a pseudo maximum likelihood (PML) procedure. The GA searches efficiently over the huge space of possible combinations of equilibria in the data. The PML procedure avoids the repeated computation of equilibria for each trial value of the parameters of interest. To test the ability of this method to get maximum likelihood estimates, we present a Monte Carlo experiment in the context of a game of price competition and collusion.

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2005-001.

as
in new window

Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-001
Contact details of provider: Postal:
270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215

Phone: 617-353-4389
Fax: 617-353-4449
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jonathan Levin (Stanford University) & Pat Bajari & Lanier Benkard, 2004. "Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 627, Econometric Society.
  2. Ariel Pakes & Michael Ostrovsky & Steve Berry, 2004. "Simple Estimators for the Parameters of Discrete Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Samples)," NBER Working Papers 10506, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro Mira, 1999. "Swapping the Nested Fixed-Point Algorithm: a Class of Estimators for Discrete Markov Decision Models," Computing in Economics and Finance 1999 332, Society for Computational Economics.
  4. Victor Aguirregabiria & Pedro Mira, 2004. "Sequential Estimation Of Dynamic Discrete Games," Working Papers wp2004_0413, CEMFI.
  5. Elie Tamer, 2003. "Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 147-165.
  6. Pesendorfer, Martin & Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp, 2003. "Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 3965, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. V. Joseph Hotz & Robert A. Miller & Seth Sanders & Jeffrey Smith, 1994. "A Simulation Estimator for Dynamic Models of Discrete Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 265-289.
  8. Rust, John, 1987. "Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(5), pages 999-1033, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2005-001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gillian Gurish)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.