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Regulatory Compliance with Limited Enforceability: Evidence from Privacy Policies

Author

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  • Bernhard Ganglmair

  • Julia Krämer

  • Jacopo Gambato

Abstract

We study how asymmetric enforceability of regulatory rules affects firms’ compliance using a simple inspection model and a large sample of German privacy policies. We exploit the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation, compelling firms to disclose, in accessible language, details of their data use. The specifics of disclosure are objective, whereas readability is subjective and difficult to enforce. We show that firms increased disclosure, but the policy readability did not improve. In line with theory, firms anticipating regulatory scrutiny and those facing higher-budget data protection authorities demonstrated a stronger response in readability compliance without sizeable effects on disclosure.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhard Ganglmair & Julia Krämer & Jacopo Gambato, 2024. "Regulatory Compliance with Limited Enforceability: Evidence from Privacy Policies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_547v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, revised Sep 2024.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_547v2
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacopo Gambato & Bernhard Ganglmair & Julia K. Krämer, 2024. "Effective Regulation and Firm Compliance: The Case of German Privacy Policies," NBER Chapters, in: Data Privacy Protection and the Conduct of Applied Research: Methods, Approaches and their Consequences, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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