IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency


  • Franz Ostrizek
  • Elia Sartori


We study strategic interactions when players observe equilibrium statistics, focusing on First, their endogenous precision as signals of the fundamental; and second, agents’ well-documented difficulty in learning from such signals. We define the novel notion of cursed expectations equilibrium with information acquisition which disciplines information acquisition in a setting with incorrect learning by means of a subjective envelope condition: agents correctly anticipate their actions but incorrectly deem them optimal. Cursed agents use and acquire more private information, which counteracts suboptimal information dissemination and increases welfare. Transparency crowds out private information but is always beneficial; other policy instruments have paradoxical effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Ostrizek & Elia Sartori, 2022. "Acquisition, (Mis)use and Dissemination of Information The Blessing of Cursedness and Transparency," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_348, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_348

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Matteo Bizzarri & Daniele d'Arienzo, 2023. "The social value of overreaction to information," CSEF Working Papers 690, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CRC Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.