IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bon/boncrc/crctr224_2018_011.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Kraehmer

Abstract

I study mechanism design settings with quasi-linear utility where the principal can provide agents with additional private information about their valuations beyond the private information they hold at the outset. I demonstrate that the principal can design information and a mechanism so as to fully extract the complete information first-best surplus if agents’ ex ante information only affects their beliefs about, yet not their valuations. Otherwise, the result holds if each agent’s initial private beliefs satisfy a spanning condition.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Kraehmer, 2018. "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_011, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_011
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/en/research-output/discussion-papers/discussion-papers#DP11
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item

    Keywords

    information design; mechanism design; quasi-linear utility; rent extraction;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CRC Office). General contact details of provider: https://www.crctr224.de/en .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.