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Report NEP-DES-2019-02-04
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019, "English versus Vickrey auctions with loss averse bidders," Discussion Papers, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, number 2019/1.
- Gentry, Matthew & Li, Tong & Lu, Jingfeng, 2017, "Auctions with selective entry," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 83664, Sep.
- Daniel Kraehmer, 2018, "Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_011, Apr.
- Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen & Sander (A.M.) Onderstal & Leonard Treuren, 2019, "Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 19-009/VII, Jan, revised 31 Jun 2020.