Anti-Takeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, And Shareholders' Interests
This paper focuses on testing alternative hypotheses that relate the adoption of anti-takeover defences to the financial characteristics of firms that adopt them. We focus on the creation of a composite measure of anti-takeover defences and then relate the intensity of this measure to the motives for instituting these defences. Our estimates indicate that while the intensity of takeover defences is negatively related to Tobin's Q and financial leverage to a significant degree, proxies for inside information play no casual role in explaining this intensity. We interpret our results as supportive of the managerial entrenchment hypotheses.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Dec 1993|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA|
Web page: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:220. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.