IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bocoec/214.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rent Control, Mismatch Costs And Search Efficiency

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiro Igarashi

    (UNCTAD/ECDC)

  • Richard Arnott

    (Depatment of Economics Boston College)

Abstract

In the discursive literature on rent control, it has been argued that rent controls cause the rental housing market to become "tighter" -- the vacancy rate falls, search costs rise, and tenants become less well-matched with housing units-but at the same time restrict landlords’ ability to exploit their market power in setting rents. Such phenomena are excluded by assumption in competitive models of the renting housing market. This paper applies a monopolistically competitive model of the rental housing market developed by Igarashi to explore these events. In the model, moderate rent controls are welfare-improving, but severe controls are harmful.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiro Igarashi & Richard Arnott, 1993. "Rent Control, Mismatch Costs And Search Efficiency," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 214, Boston College Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:214
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arnott, Richard, 1989. "Housing Vacancies, Thin Markets, and Idiosyncratic Tastes," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 5-30, February.
    2. Smith, Lawrence B & Rosen, Kenneth T & Fallis, George, 1988. "Recent Developments in Economic Models of Housing Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 26(1), pages 29-64, March.
    3. Wheaton, William C, 1990. "Vacancy, Search, and Prices in a Housing Market Matching Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1270-1292, December.
    4. Anderson, Simon P & de Palma, Andre & Nesterov, Yurii, 1995. "Oligopolistic Competition and the Optimal Provision of Products," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1281-1301, November.
    5. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    6. Sweeney, James L., 1974. "A commodity hierarchy model of the rental housing market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 288-323, July.
    7. Arnott, Richard, 1987. "Economic theory and housing," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics,in: E. S. Mills (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 959-988 Elsevier.
    8. John M. Quigley, 1976. "Housing Demand in the Short Run: An Analysis of Polytomous Choice," NBER Chapters,in: Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1, pages 76-102 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    10. Anas, Alex, 1997. "Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 111-137, July.
    11. Sweeney, James L, 1974. "Quality, Commodity Hierarchies, and Housing Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(1), pages 147-167, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raess, Pascal & von Ungern-Sternberg, Thomas, 2002. "A model of regulation in the rental housing market," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 475-500, July.
    2. Blair Jenkins, 2009. "Rent Control: Do Economists Agree?," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 6(1), pages 73-112, January.
    3. Svarer, Michael & Rosholm, Michael & Munch, Jakob Roland, 2005. "Rent control and unemployment duration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2165-2181, December.
    4. Zheng, Diehang & Deng, Yongheng & Gordon, Peter & Dale-Johnson, David, 2007. "An examination of the impact of rent control on mobile home prices in California," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 209-242, June.
    5. Munch, Jakob Roland & Svarer, Michael, 2002. "Rent control and tenancy duration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 542-560, November.
    6. Patric H. Hendershott & Bryan D. MacGregor & Raymond Y.C. Tse, 2002. "Estimation of the Rental Adjustment Process," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 30(2), pages 165-183.
    7. Mense, Andreas & Michelsen, Claus & Cholodilin, Konstantin A., 2017. "Empirics on the causal effects of rent control in Germany," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 24/2017, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    8. repec:ebl:ecbull:eb-17-00777 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Gaetano Lisi, 2016. "Mortgage Market, Housing Tenure Choice and Unemployment," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 472-493, November.
    10. Anne Laferrère & David le Blanc, 2002. "Comment les aides au logement affectent-elles les loyers ?," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 351(1), pages 3-30.
    11. Van Ommeren, Jos N. & Van der Vlist, Arno J., 2016. "Households' willingness to pay for public housing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 91-105.
    12. Mark A. C. Kattenberg & Wolter H. J. Hassink, 2017. "Who Moves Out of Social Housing? The Effect of Rent Control on Housing Tenure Choice," De Economist, Springer, vol. 165(1), pages 43-66, March.
    13. Konstantin A. Kholodilin & Andreas Mense & Claus Michelsen, 2016. "Market Break or Simply Fake? Empirics on the Causal Effects of Rent Controls in Germany," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1584, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    14. Laferrere, Anne & Le Blanc, David, 2004. "How do housing allowances affect rents? An empirical analysis of the French case," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 36-67, March.
    15. Eva M. Berger & Felix Schmidt, 2017. "Unburden Renters by Making Landlords Pay the Commission? Evaluating a Policy Reform in Germany," Working Papers 1716, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    16. Micheli, Martin & Schmidt, Torsten, 2015. "Welfare effects of rent control — A comparison of redistributive policies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 237-247.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:214. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F Baum) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/debocus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.