Implementability of Correlated and Communication Equilibrium Outcomes in Incomplete Information Games
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KeywordsCorrelated equilibrium; Communication equilibrium; Incomplete information; Bayesian games; Mechanism; Correlation device; Implementation;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-11-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2009-11-21 (Game Theory)
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