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Central banks: between internationalisation and domestic political control


  • Harold James


The paper examines the exercise, the efficiency, and the legitimacy of the monetary policy-making process. The goal of central bank autonomy in recent times is the outcome of a demand for price stability. The realisation of autonomy is also a consequence of the fragmentation of national decision making, in federal systems but also in regional and international monetary arrangements. Economic and financial crisis changes the political economy, and produces a transition from seeing the central bank as producing a general or universalisable good (price stability) to interpreting monetary policy as fundamentally a tool for redistributive or factional policies. The latter will only work in the framework of national policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Harold James, 2010. "Central banks: between internationalisation and domestic political control," BIS Working Papers 327, Bank for International Settlements.
  • Handle: RePEc:bis:biswps:327

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    Cited by:

    1. Riccardo Fiorentini & Guido Montani, 2012. "The New Global Political Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14443.

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    central bank independence; central bank governance; monetary policy financial crisis;
    All these keywords.

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