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Symmetric Expected Utility

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  • Preker, Jurek

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

We investigate and axiomatize preferences that display indifference between deterministic states, but exhibit strict orderings over lotteries over these states. Such preferences might be due to the ability to adopt to states, or a (dis)taste for uncertainty. We derive a representation theorem for preferences that are symmetric—that is, a decision maker is indifferent between a lottery and its permutations over the set of states—, continuous, and satisfy a weakened version of independence. We then describe when these preferences exhibit a taste or distaste for uncertainty. Finally, we characterize pairs of lotteries for which every uncertainty-averse decision maker prefers one of the lotteries over the other one.

Suggested Citation

  • Preker, Jurek, 2026. "Symmetric Expected Utility," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 761, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:761
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    File URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/3013521/3013522
    File Function: First Version, 2026
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