IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The principle of subsidiarity and centripetal forces: 14 years of application of the 2001 Italian constitutional reform


  • Cristina Giorgiantonio

    () (Banca d'Italia)


The 2001 reform made profound changes to the Italian Constitution, which led to a broad transfer of legislative powers from the State to the regions. The paper analyses the division of legislative powers introduced in 2001 from two points of view: i) consistency with the indications of economic literature; and ii) the effect on the functioning of the institutional system. In some cases the changes enacted in 2001 do not seem to meet efficiency criteria. Regarding the effects on the institutional system, the reform does not appear to have had an impact on the amount of laws approved at the regional level. However, there was a substantial increase in litigation between the State and the regions before the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the decisions of the Constitutional Court have tended to circumscribe the exercise of regional legislative powers in order to ensure uniform rules and a homogeneous level of protection throughout the country.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristina Giorgiantonio, 2017. "The principle of subsidiarity and centripetal forces: 14 years of application of the 2001 Italian constitutional reform," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 376, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_376_17

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    riforme costituzionali; federalismo; poteri legislativi;

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bdi:opques:qef_376_17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.