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Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Arup Daripa

    (Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics, Birkbeck)

Abstract

I analyze the incentive for costly information collection in a multi-unit commonvalue uniform-price auction in which bidders submit demand functions. I show that so long as there are some bidders who have a very high cost of information collection, even if there are a large number of other bidders who face an arbitrarily small cost of information collection, there are equilibria in which no bidder collects information.

Suggested Citation

  • Arup Daripa, 2007. "Uninformative Equilibrium in Uniform Price Auctions," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0701, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0701
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    File URL: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26904
    File Function: First version, 2007
    Download Restriction: no
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Costly information acquisition; uniform price auction; uninformed bidders; uninformative equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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