An Economic Perspective on Asymmetric Federalism in Canada: The Case of Quebec

This paper presents the various and unique policy choices made by Quebec since WWII and examines their impacts. This can be of interest to scholars of federalism since Quebec is arguably one of the most autonomous subnational governments in industrialized countries. The paper is divided in three parts. The first examines the constitutional/legal framework that organizes the division of powers between levels of government in Canada in general and with a focus on constitutional asymmetry. The second part presents key aspects of QuebecÕs asymmetry in various jurisdictional fields including their financial importance. The third part of the paper turns to why asymmetry has emerged in Canadian federalism, then examines the consequences of asymmetry. The consequences for Quebec of this asymmetry are a strengthening of its francophone identity, and, compared to Ontario, a larger provincial public sector and more equal post tax-transfers income distribution. There is no evidence that it does better in terms of economic growth. Federal transfers to Quebec, corrected for transferred tax points, are not increased or decreased by asymmetric federalism. The consequences for Canada of this asymmetry are that they may have helped thwart the secessionist project in Quebec while allowing the laboratory dimension of federalism.