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The Economics of Regional Demarcation in Banking

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Abstract

Cooperation among savings and cooperative banks was criticized by the European Commission because of potentially anti-competitive effects. In an industrial economics model of banks taking deposits and giving loans we look at regional demarcation as one of such cooperative practices. There are two adjacent markets with one savings or cooperative bank being focused on each one and one private commercial bank serving both. We find that abolishing regional demarcation indeed increases total loan volume. Savings or cooperative banks always improve market performance and do better without regional demarcation which shields the private commercial bank from aggressive competition by these banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Simone Raab & Peter Welzel, 2010. "The Economics of Regional Demarcation in Banking," Discussion Paper Series 308, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:aug:augsbe:0308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banking; competition; cooperation; non-profit firms;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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