Financial Intermediation with Proprietary Information
I contrast equilibria in loan markets under bilateral bank- borrower relationships, in which proprietary technological knowledge of borrowers is not revealed to product-market competitors, with equilibria under multilateral financing which may lead to such knowledge being shared across product-market competitors. I examine the conditions for equilibrium existence, ex ante efficiency, and incentives to undertake privately-financed, costly knowledge-generating R&D, under these two differing institutional mechanisms for financing R&D-intensive investments by firms competing in product markets.
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