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The Moroccan Public Procurement Game

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  • Nizar Riane

Abstract

In this paper, we study the public procurement market through the lens of game theory by modeling it as a strategic game with discontinuous and non-quasiconcave payoffs. We first show that the game admits no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We then analyze the two-player case and derive two explicit mixed-strategy equilibria for the symmetric game and for the weighted $(p,1-p)$ formulation. Finally, we study the existence of a symmetric mixed strategies Nash equilibrium in the general $N$-player case by applying the diagonal disjoint payoff matching condition.

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  • Nizar Riane, 2025. "The Moroccan Public Procurement Game," Papers 2512.10109, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2512.10109
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2512.10109
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