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How Exclusive are Ethereum Transactions? Evidence from non-winning blocks

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  • Vabuk Pahari
  • Andrea Canidio

Abstract

We analyze 15,097 blocks proposed for inclusion in Ethereum's blockchain over an eight-minute window on December 3, 2024, during which 38 blocks were added to the chain. We classify transactions as exclusive -- appearing only in blocks from a single builder -- or private -- absent from the public mempool but included in blocks from multiple builders. We find that, depending on the methodology, exclusive transactions account for between 77.2% and 84% of the total fees paid by transactions in winning blocks. Moreover, we show that exclusivity cannot be fully attributed to persistent relationships between senders and builders: only between 7% and 8.4% of all on-chain exclusive transaction value originates from senders who route exclusively to one builder. Finally, we observe that transaction exclusivity is dynamic. Some transactions are exclusive at the start of a bidding cycle but later appear in blocks from multiple builders. Other transactions remain exclusive to a losing builder for two or three cycles before appearing in the public mempool. These transactions are therefore delayed and then exposed to potential attacks.

Suggested Citation

  • Vabuk Pahari & Andrea Canidio, 2025. "How Exclusive are Ethereum Transactions? Evidence from non-winning blocks," Papers 2509.16052, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2025.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2509.16052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tivas Gupta & Mallesh M Pai & Max Resnick, 2023. "The Centralizing Effects of Private Order Flow on Proposer-Builder Separation," Papers 2305.19150, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    2. Paul Janicot & Alex Vinyas, 2025. "Private MEV Protection RPCs: Benchmark Stud," Papers 2505.19708, arXiv.org.
    3. Maryam Bahrani & Pranav Garimidi & Tim Roughgarden, 2024. "Centralization in Block Building and Proposer-Builder Separation," Papers 2401.12120, arXiv.org.
    4. Andrea Canidio & Vabuk Pahari, 2025. "Becoming Immutable: How Ethereum is Made," Papers 2506.04940, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2025.
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