The role of a matchmaker in buyer-vendor interactions
We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial matching problem. We compare the optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the impact of correlations on the system.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2009|
|Date of revision:||Jul 2009|
|Publication status:||Published in European Physical Journal B 71, 565-571 (2009)|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://arxiv.org/|
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