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Theft in equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Weinschelbaum

    (Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. CONICET)

Abstract

We incorporate theft in a partial equilibrium model. This model allows us to per­ form positive and normative analysis using traditional Marshallian tools, as well as to obtain results that do not hinge on specific parametric specifications. We analyze the model's implications under two scenarios, one in which all factors of production are subject to theft, and another in which only final goods are stealable.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Weinschelbaum, 2020. "Theft in equilibrium," Working Papers 20, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    • Handle: RePEc:aoz:wpaper:20
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Oscar Volij & Casilda Lasso de la Vega & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2020. "Theft in equilibrium," Working Papers 2001, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Casilda Lasso de la Vega & Oscar Volij & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2021. "Can more police induce more crime?," Working Papers 2107, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Casilda Lasso de la Vega & Oscar Volij & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2023. "When do more police induce more crime?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 759-778, October.
    4. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Naomi Oosterman, 2025. "Before the hammer falls: an empirical analysis of the market reaction to art thefts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 77-100, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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