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Monetary policy loss functions: two cheers for the quadratic

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  • CHADHA, Jagjit
  • SCHELLEKENS, Philip

Abstract

Following Blinder’s (1997) suggestion, we examine the implications for the optimal interest rate rule which follow from relaxing the assumption that the policymaker’s loss function is quadratic. We investigate deviations from quadratics for both symmetric and asymmetric preferences for a single target and find that (i) other characterizations of risk aversion than implied by the quadratic only affect dead-weight losses, unless there is multiplicative uncertainty; (ii) asymmetries affect the optimal rule under both additive and multiplicative uncertainty but result in interest rate paths observationally similar, and in some cases equivalent, to those implied by a shifted quadratic; (iii) the use of asymmetric loss functions leads to important insights on the issue of goal independence and monetary policy delegation; (iv) non-quadratic preferences, per se, are neither sufficient nor necessary to generate the ‘Brainard conservatism principle’ and thus do not offer much added value when analyzing policy issues of caution and gradualism. Our results suggest that in the context of monetary policymaking the convenient assumption of quadratic losses may not be that drastic after all.

Suggested Citation

  • CHADHA, Jagjit & SCHELLEKENS, Philip, "undated". "Monetary policy loss functions: two cheers for the quadratic," Working Papers 1999002, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:1999002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Horowitz, Ann R., 1987. "Loss functions and public policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, pages 489-504.
    2. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1997. "Inflation forecast targeting: Implementing and monitoring inflation targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, pages 1111-1146.
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    4. Shiller, Robert J., 1999. "Human behavior and the efficiency of the financial system," Handbook of Macroeconomics,in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 20, pages 1305-1340 Elsevier.
    5. repec:cup:etheor:v:13:y:1997:i:6:p:808-17 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Christoffersen, Peter F. & Diebold, Francis X., 1997. "Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(06), pages 808-817, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Corrado, Luisa & Holly, Sean, 2003. "Nonlinear Phillips curves, mixing feedback rules and the distribution of inflation and output," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 467-492, December.
    2. Tena, Juan de Dios & Tremayne, A.R., 2009. "Modelling monetary transmission in UK manufacturing industry," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, pages 1053-1066.
    3. Mayer, Eric, 2003. "The mechanics of a reasonably fitted quarterly New Keynesian macro model," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 41, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
    4. Mirco Soffritti & Francesco Zanetti, 2008. "The advantage of tying one's hands: revisited," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(2), pages 135-149.
    5. Özer Karagedikli & Kirdan Lees, 2004. "Do inflation targeting central banks behave asymmetrically? Evidence from Australia and New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP 2004/02, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
    6. Paolo Surico, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 108, Society for Computational Economics.
    7. Hyeon-seung Huh & Hyun Lee & Namkyung Lee, 2009. "Nonlinear Phillips curve, NAIRU and monetary policy rules," Empirical Economics, Springer, pages 131-151.
    8. Pierre-Richard Agénor, 2002. "Monetary Policy under Flexible Exchange Rates: An Introduction to Inflation Targeting," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series,in: Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series Editor) (ed.), Inflation Targeting: Desing, Performance, Challenges, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 3, pages 079-170 Central Bank of Chile.
    9. Xavier Debrun, 2000. "Fiscal Rules in a Monetary Union: A Short-Run Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 323-358, October.
    10. al-Nowaihi, Ali & Stracca, Livio, 2002. "Non-standard central bank loss functions, skewed risks, and certainty equivalence," Working Paper Series 0129, European Central Bank.
    11. Paolo Surico, 2002. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences," Macroeconomics 0210002, EconWPA, revised 23 Feb 2004.
    12. Feldkord, Eva-Ulrike, 2005. "On the relevance of monetary aggregates in monetary policy models," HWWA Discussion Papers 317, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    13. Ajax R. B. Moreira & Marco A. F. H. Cavalcanti, 2015. "Robustness and Stabilization Properties of Monetary Policy Rules in Brazil," Discussion Papers 0100, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - IPEA.
    14. Surico, Paolo, 2003. "US Monetary Policy Rules: the Case for Asymmetric Preferences," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 199, Royal Economic Society.
    15. Paolo Surico, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: The Case of Asymmetric Preferences (new title: The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1280, CESifo Group Munich.
    16. Tomasz Michalak & Jacob Engwerda & Joseph Plasmans, 2009. "Strategic Interactions between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Multi-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 2534, CESifo Group Munich.
    17. Corrado, L. & Holly, S., 2000. "Piecewise Linear Feedback Rules in a Non Linear Model of the Phillips Curve: Evidence from the US and the UK," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0019, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    18. Simone Casellina & Mariacristina Uberti, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy and Long-term Interest Rate Dynamics: Taylor Rule Extensions," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 183-198, September.
    19. Osama D. Sweidan, 2009. "Asymmetric central bank's preference and inflation rate in Jordan," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 26(4), pages 232-245, October.
    20. Surico, Paolo, 2007. "The Fed's monetary policy rule and U.S. inflation: The case of asymmetric preferences," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 305-324, January.
    21. Simon Hall & Chris Salmon & Tony Yates & Nicoletta Batini, 1999. "Uncertainty and Simple Monetary Policy Rules - An illustration for the United Kingdom," Bank of England working papers 96, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Loss functions; Uncertainty; Optimal monetary policy rules;

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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