Programas De Leniência, Corrupção E O Papel Da Corregedoria Da Autoridade Antitruste
Leniency programs have shown to be an important tool to fight cartels. By reducing fees or guaranteeing imunity against criminal prosecution, leniency programs provide incentives to cartelized firms to reveal the cartel activities. We reveal the recent literature on leniency programs as well as some real world experiences. Then we introduce corruption of the antitrust authorities into Motta and Polo's (2003) model and analyse its effects. We show that in order for the government to implement some parameters associated with leniency programs, it has to spend some money too to reduce corruptibility. Such spending may not always pay.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Prof Marcos Valdemar de Freitas Reis s/n Campus do Gragoatá Bloco F Niterói, RJ 24210-201 Brazil|
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Web page: http://www.anpec.org.br
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|Order Information:|| Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Prof Marcos Valdemar de Freitas Reis s/n Campus do Gragoatá Bloco F Niterói, RJ 24210-201 Brazil|
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