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Trust under Fire: Civil War and Tax Morale in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author

Listed:
  • Alessandro Belmonte

    (Department of Economics and Social Sciences - Marche Polytechnic University, Italy)

  • Vincenzo Bove

    (IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Italy)

  • Jessica Di Salvatore

    (Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence, Italy)

Abstract

The classic bellicist account was developed to explain state formation through interstate warfare in early modern Europe, not contemporary armed conflict. We ask whether its fiscal mechanism extends to contemporary intrastate wars in Sub-Saharan Africa and whether prior institutional trust shapes citizens' fiscal responses to insecurity. Combining seven Afrobarometer rounds with conflict-related fatality data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, we examine how civil-war intensity is associated with tax morale and reported tax-payment behavior. We find that civil-war intensity is associated with higher tax morale, especially where prior institutional trust is high. By contrast, greater civil-war intensity is associated with lower reported tax compliance, although this negative relationship weakens or reverses as prior institutional trust increases. In a complementary design, we treat coups in neighboring countries, whose timing is plausibly as-if random, as shocks to the perceived risk of regional instability and cross-border spillovers. Although the pooled post-coup estimate is statistically indistinguishable from zero, country-specific estimates vary, and the interaction with institutional trust is positive. Overall, the results suggest that prior institutional trust may help sustain citizens' willingness to support states’ fiscal capacity during periods of insecurity, but they also reveal a gap between normative support for taxation and reported compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Alessandro Belmonte & Vincenzo Bove & Jessica Di Salvatore, 2026. "Trust under Fire: Civil War and Tax Morale in Sub-Saharan Africa," Working Papers 512, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:512
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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