Toward An Augmented Theory Of Cooperative Behavior: The Case Of Clustering In Animal Agriculture
An augmented theory of cooperative behavior is presented. This game-theoretic model details two obstacles to cooperation which often arise when stakeholders are negotiating local land-use conflicts. First, protracted involvement from outsiders can deter long-run cooperation. Second, if stakeholders fail to frame the expected pay-offs from cooperating similarly -- both their ethical stances and their choices of language -- then their likelihood of successful cooperation is reduced. Case studies of communities divided about whether and where to site livestock facilities in the rural-urban fringe (clustering) are invoked to demonstrate how deadlock can occur, even where long-term collaboration would appear more cost-effective than ongoing conflict between neighbors.
|Date of creation:||1998|
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