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Pairing Games and Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Alkan, Ahmet
  • Tuncay, Alparslan

Abstract

Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also introduce the solution concept of pseudostable allocations and show that they are in the Demand Bargaining Set. We give a dynamic Market Procedure that reaches the Equilibrium Set in a bounded number of steps. We use elementary tools of graph theory and a representation theorem obtained here.

Suggested Citation

  • Alkan, Ahmet & Tuncay, Alparslan, 2014. "Pairing Games and Markets," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 172704, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:172704
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.172704
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/172704/files/NDL2014-048.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Gudmundsson , Jens, 2014. "Sequences in Pairing Problems: A New Approach to Reconcile Stability with Strategy-Proofness for Elementary Matching Problems," Working Papers 2014:40, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    2. Manjunath, Vikram, 2016. "Fractional matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 321-336.

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