Initial Allocation Effects in Permit Markets with Bertrand Output Oligopoly
We analyse the efficiency effects of the initial permit allocation given to firms with market power in both permit and output market. We examine two models: a long- run model with endogenous technology and capacity choice, and a short-run model with fixed technology and capacity. In the long run, quantity pre-commitment with Bertrand competition can yield Cournot outcomes also under emissions trading. In the short run, Bertrand output competition reproduces the effects derived under Cournot competition, but displays higher pass-through profits. In a second-best setting of overallocation, a tighter emissions target tends to improve permit-market efficiency in the short run.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2010|
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