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Labour, An Equivocal Concept for Economic Analyses


  • Ebbe Yndgaard

    () (Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark)


Ever since the adoption of the symbiosis of mathematical analytical methods and marginalism in economics, there has been a tendency of negligence in the sense that it is seldom to ask the dual question: what are the fundamental assumptions on which the above approach is resting and are they worth while as measured by realia? In a rather informal form we try to address some aspects of these basic questions. A main result is that it is very doubtful to rely too naively on main stream results, relying on a one- dimensional concept of homogenous labour. Most of the standard results on this foundation - including those of unemployment - are ambiguous, at best.

Suggested Citation

  • Ebbe Yndgaard, "undated". "Labour, An Equivocal Concept for Economic Analyses," Economics Working Papers 2000-5, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
  • Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-5

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Heterogenous labour; measurement and mathematical representability; economic methodology;

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • E1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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