Why the ECB Should be Ultra-Liberal
The statute of the ECB states that its primary target should be to maintain price stability. The theoretical foundation behind this target is that of a socially optimal conservative central banker. We challenge the robustness of this result in a model with endogenous labor market policy, decided upon by a politically motivated government. In this model, the socially optimal choice of central banker is an ultra-liberal, who eliminates both inflation and unemployment and removes the political distortion. Somewhat paradoxically, the labor union supports an ultra-conservative central banker, because this means a more generous labor market policy.
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