Report NEP-GTH-2020-11-16
This is the archive for NEP-GTH, a report on new working papers in the area of Game Theory. Sylvain Béal (Sylvain Beal) issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-GTH
The following items were announced in this report:
- A. D. Correia & L. L. Leestmaker & H. T. C. Stoof, 2020, "Asymmetric games on networks: towards an Ising-model representation," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2011.02739, Nov, revised Aug 2021.
- Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach, 2020, "Open Rule Legislative Bargaining," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 20/346, Nov.
- Ron Berman & Yuval Heller, 2020, "Naive analytics equilibrium," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2010.15810, Oct, revised Apr 2021.
- Alessandro Sontuoso & Sudeep Bhatia, 2020, "A Notion of Prominence for Games with Natural-Language Labels," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 20-38.
- Manuel Staab, 2020, "Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Preferences in Anti-Coordination Games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2011.02740, Nov, revised Mar 2023.
- Masaaki Fujii, 2020, "Probabilistic Approach to Mean Field Games and Mean Field Type Control Problems with Multiple Populations," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-497, Nov.
- Strulik, Holger & Werner, Katharina, 2020, "Renewable resource use with imperfect self-control," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics, number 408.
- Montinaro, Marta & Pal, Rupayan & Scrimitore, Marcella, , "Per Unit and Ad Valorem Royalties in a Patent Licensing Game," FACTS: Firms And Cities Towards Sustainability, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) > FACTS: Firms And Cities Towards Sustainability, number 307305, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.307305.
- Renee Bowen & Ilwoo Hwang & Stefan Krasa, 2020, "Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 27981, Oct.
- Heursen, Lea & Ranehill, Eva & Weber, Roberto A, 2020, "Are women less effective leaders than men? Evidence from experiments using coordination games," Working Papers in Economics, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics, number 796, Nov.
- José Mª Alonso-Meijide & Mikel Álvarez-Mozos & Mª Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro & Andrés Jiménez-Losada, 2019, "A new order on embedded coalitions: Properties and applications," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2019/388.
- Key, Peter & Steinberg, Richard, 2020, "Pricing, competition and content for internet service providers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 107008, Oct.
- David J. Cooper & Jordi Brandts, 2020, "Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1211, Oct.
- Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Nina Rapoport, 2020, "Voluntary contributions in cascades: The tragedy of ill-informed leadership," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers), HAL, number halshs-02977853, Oct.
- Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, 2020, "Epistemological Mechanism Design (Revised version of CARF-F-496)," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-498, Nov, revised Feb 2021.
- Wiens, Marcus & Mahdavian, Farnaz & Platt, Stephen & Schultmann, Frank, 2020, "Optimal evacuation-decisions facing the trade-off between early-warning precision, evacuation-cost and trust - the Warning Compliance Model (WCM)," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP), number 47, DOI: 10.5445/IR/1000125578.
- Takahiko Kan, 2020, "Reinterpreting the General Rules of Morality and the Corruption of Moral Sentiments in The Theory of Moral Sentiments with an Evolutionary Game Model," TERG Discussion Papers, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University, number 432, Sep.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Stephane Luchini & A. Malézieux & Jason F. Shogren, 2020, "Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-02576845, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103369.
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