Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2025-01-13.html
Report NEP-DES-2025-01-13
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Vitali Gretschko & Jasmina Simon, 2024, "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism with Covert Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2024_616, Dec.
- Elizabeth Baldwin & Paul Klemperer & Edwin Lock, 2024, "Implementing Walrasian Equilibrium: The Languages of Product-Mix Auctions," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 1060, Dec.
- Takeshi Nishimura & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2024, "On the Performance of the Crémer–McLean Auction: An Experiment," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1266, Nov.
- Dirk Bergemann & Marek Bojko & Paul DŸtting & Renato Paes Leme & Haifeng Xu & Song Zuo, 2024, "Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2418, Dec.
- Selcuk, Cemil, 2024, "Competition for Budget-Constrained Buyers: Exploring All-Pay Auctions," Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section, number E2024/26, Dec.
- Shosuke Noguchi & Suguru Otani, 2024, "The Option Value of Contract Duration: Evidence from the U.S. Timber Market," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2412.20285, Dec, revised Dec 2025.
- Fridahl, Mathias & Möllersten, Kenneth & Lundberg, Liv & Rickels, Wilfried, 2024, "Potential and goal conflicts in reverse auction design for bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 306863, DOI: 10.1186/s12302-024-00971-0.
- Hikmet Gunay & Xin Meng & Victor Perez, 2024, "Selling Order in a Sequential Auction," ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka, number 1271, Dec.
- De Groote, Olivier & Rho, Minyoung, 2024, "Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1600, Dec, revised Feb 2026.
- Matheus V. X. Ferreira & Yotam Gafni & Max Resnick, 2024, "Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2412.20853, Dec.