Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/n/nep-des/2023-07-31.html
Report NEP-DES-2023-07-31
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Pablo R. Arribillaga & Eliana Pepa Risma, 2023, "Obvious Manipulations in Matching with and without Contracts," Working Papers, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE), number 257, Jul.
- Tetsutaro Hatakeyama, 2023, "When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University, number 2023-012, Jul.
- Shanglyu Deng & Qiyao Zhou, 2023, "Recurring Auctions with Costly Entry: Theory and Evidence," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2306.17355, Jun, revised Feb 2025.
- Di Feng, 2023, "Endowments-swapping-proofness and Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2023-14, Jun.
- Chenghong Luo & Chaoran Sun & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2023, "The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1400, Jul.