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Report NEP-DES-2022-11-28
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Itzhak Rasooly, 2022, "Competitive equilibrium and the double auction," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 974, Jul.
- Yi-Chun Chen & Gaoji Hu & Xiangqian Yang, 2022, "Information Design in Allocation with Costly Verification," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.16001, Oct.
- Alexei Parakhonyak & Anton Sobolev, 2022, "Persuasion without Priors," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 977, Jul.
- Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2022, "Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.12794, Oct, revised Aug 2023.
- Item repec:tin:wpaper:20220084 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Yotam Gafni & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2022, "Optimal Mechanism Design for Agents with DSL Strategies: The Case of Sybil Attacks in Combinatorial Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2210.15181, Oct, revised Jul 2023.
- Péter Eso & Chris Wallace, 2022, "Evidence Disclosure in Competitive Markets," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 980, Jul.